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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FRAUD IN PENNSYLVANIA WILLS*
By

A. J. WHITE

HUTTON *

Undue Influence and Fraud.
There is nothing in the Wills Act of 1947 or prior acts concerning undue
influence or fraud in the matter of testamentary dispositions. These legal concepts
are the product of the judicial mind. It is obvious, however, that in the exercise of
testamentary power the testator must be a free agent. As expressed by Professor
Bigelow: I
"The will must, of course, be the will of the person who executes the
instrument; which means that it must have been his free or voluntary act.
Now one's freedom of action may be taken away either by coercion or by
what is called undue influence."
An English View.
One of the best, concise expositions on undue influence is found in Hall v.
Hall2 by Sir J. P. Wilde:
"To make a good will a man must be a free agent. But all influences
are not unlawful. Persuasion, appeals to the affections or ties of kindred,
to a sentiment of gratitude for past services, or pity for future destitution,
or the like, these are all legitimate, and may be fairly pressed on a testator. On the other hand, pressure of whatever character whether acting on
the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to overpower the volition without
convincing the judgment, is a species of restraint under which no valid
will can be made. Importunity or threats, such as the testator has not the
courage to resist, moral command asserted and yielded to for the sake of
peace and quiet or, of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort,
these, if carried to a degree in which the free play of the testator's
judgment, dicretion or wishes, is overborne, will constitute undue influence, though no force is either used or threatened. In a word, a testator may be led but not driven; and his will must be the offspring of his
own volition, and not the record of some one else's."
The problem of undue influence is frequently intertwined with and shades
into the problem of testamentary capacity. In many cases it is difficult or inexpedient
to separate them.8 However, if it is shown that a testator lacks testamentary capacity,
*Being part of the Revised Edition of HUTTON ON WILLS to be published. All rights reserved
by A. J. White Hutton.
**A.B., Gettysburg College 1897; A.M., Gettysburg College, 1899; LL.B., Harvard University,
1902; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law 1902.; Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 1931-35; Author of HUTTON ON WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
1 Law of Wills, 81.
2 L. R. 1P.&D. 481.
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obviously it is unnecessary to go into the issue of undue influence. On the other
hand, if a testator has testamentary capacity, it may nevertheless be of such a low
order as to make him an easy subject of undue influence. It is important also to keep
these issues distinct in charging a jury and to instruct that separate findings be made
on each issue. In Tawney v. Long,4 Green J., was constrained to reverse a judgment
entered for the defendants-contestants on a general verdict on issues of testamentary
capacity and undue influence because there was no sufficient evidence of the latter,
but there was of the former. The court could not tell whether the jury had found for
contestants on both issues or upon merely one and which one, hence an order for a
new trial.
In the remarks of Sir J. P. Wilde, supra, after observing that the testator must
be a free agent, the learned judge divides his statement into two parts, (a) lawful
influence, and (b) unlawful influence. Accordingly, in the present discourse the
same order will be followed. The very phrase undue influence raises by implication
the converse of due influence. Let us consider these influences.
Marital Influences.
One of the influences exerted on testamentary disposition, not considered unusual or illegal, and to the contrary to be expected normally, arises in the relationship
of husband and wife and their conduct one to the other. In the early case of Moritz
v. Brough5 is found a typical set of facts, long a classic in our annals of wills. The
facts were developed on a feigned issue directed by the Register's Court to try the
validity of a writing purporting to be the will of Peter Moritz, dated December
25th, 1817, about seven years before testator's death. After the will was formally
proved defendant-contestant offered to prove that about a couple of months before
the will was made and just after the marriage of defendant and Polly, daughter of
testator, her mother, testator's wife, was dissatisfied with the marriage and in the
presence of the witness told testator he should now make a will and that Polly should
be left nothing and that testator had replied there was time enough; that the wife
insisted that the daughter and husband should be left nothing but the testator was
opposed to the arrangement; that the wife exercised a great control over testator,
at all times and was a woman of high temper, managed the whole establishment,
indoor and outdoor, and that testator was a man of easy disposition. This was to be
followed by evidence of declarations of testator made before and after the date
of the will that he would have made a different will but for the temper of his wife
and that the will was made through her importunity and his fear of her violence.
The offer was objected to but the court overruled the objection and admitted the
evidence with exception to plaintiff. The jury found for the defendant. On plaintiff
assigning the above ruling for error, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
4 76 Pa. 106 (1874).
6 16 S. & R. 403 (1827) argued Oct. 31, 1827 at Chambersburg - Southern District - October
Term before Gibson, C. J. (appointed May 18, 1827) and Duncan. Rogers, Huston and Tod, Associate Justices. N. B. In this volume is "An Eulogium upon Hon. Win. Tilghman, late Chief Justice of
Pennsylvania, by Horace Binney."
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entered on the verdict and awarded a new trial holding that to set aside a will duly
executed by a man of competent understanding, evidence is not admissible of declarations made by him, that he intended differently, and was importuned by his wife, or
of his wife's high temper and interference with testator in relation to his will.6
In Zimmerman v. Zimmerman7 Woodward, J., thus commented upon this
earlier case:
"If a wife by her virtues has gained such an ascendancy over her husband, that her pleasure is the law of his conduct, such influence is no
reasoii for impeaching a will made in her favor, even to the exclusion of
the residue of her family; though if that influence was specially exerted to
procure the will in question, it might be sufficient to impeach it: Small v.
Small, 4 Greenleaf 220."
Although the learned Justice presents the more pleasing picture of the virtuous
wife influencing her husband, it is possible to get the same legal results in case of a
vicious wife influencing the admiring husband. In short, lawful influence may be
exerted by one's evil associates as effectually as by good companions, which is aptly
pointed out by Sir James Hannen in Wingrove v. Wingrove.8
9
On the other hand in Perret v. Perre1
our reports present an instance of an
evil and malicious wife influencing a dying husband to disinherit their only son
and thus described by Green, J.:
"As to the twelfth assignment, in relation to the declarations and
acts of Sarah Perret as to what she would do, and what she did actually do,
in procuring the will to be made as it is, it would be strange indeed if these
should be excluded. She was the very person who was charged with having exercised the undue influence, andher declarations were of her own
purpose to do that very thing, to have Henr cut off without a cent, by
means of a will which she would procure her husband to make. And
this was followed up by actual and undisputed proof that that very thing
was done, and at the very time she said she would have it done, to wit:
the same night. And now we have before us that very will, actually made
on that same night, and actually cutting Henry off from every possibility
of getting a single penny of the estate, and yet we are asked to exclude
evidence of her acts and declarations in producing that result. Most
certainly we will do no such thing. The ingenuity displayed in accomplishing her object is something remarkable. If the will had nothing more in it
than a gift of the whole estate to the wife, and then she had died before
her husband, intestate, Henry would have received one-half the estate as
heir of his mother. But even that possibility was excluded by the next provision in the will, giving the whole estate to the daughter in case the wife
died before her husband. The evil purpose, the positive malignity of the
woman, could not be more strongly indicated than by this provision; and
that too against her only son, who had contributed by his daily and un6 Declarations of a testator
tending to show undue influence must be supported by other testimony of the fact,
Keen's Est..
299 Pa. 430 (1930) 149 A. 737; Cookson's Est. 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188
A. 904; Buhan v. Kesler, 328 Pa. 312 (1937) 194 A. 917.
'1 23 Pa. 375 (1854).
S11 P. D. 81.
9 148 Pa. 131 (1898), 39 A. 33.
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requited toil for twenty-five years to the support and maintenance of
both his parents. It is doubtful if so gross a case of unnatural malevolence
of a mother to a son can be found in the books. The principles and
authorities cited in support of the twelfth assignment have nothing to do
with this subject, and they are altogether inapplicable. The assignment is
dismissed."
The marital influences may likewise impel a wife to make a will in favor of
her husband and to the exclusion of her children and the reports furnish such an
illustration in Spence's Estate'0 where there was an appeal from probate by a son
and daughter of the testatrix and a petition to the orphans' court for the awarding of
issues on testamentary capacity and undue influence which were refused. In affirming the decree of the lower court, Walling, J., declared:
"The evidence establishes no circumstances indicating that the will was
procured by fraud or undue influence. There is nothing to indilcate that
Mr. Spence had or exercised any influence over his wife, except that he
was her husband; and, being a near relative, the fact that he wrote the will
in which he was sole beneficiary does not cast upon him the burden of
proof as it would in case of a stranger: Blume v. Hartman, 115 P,. 32.
Mrs. Spence is presumed to know the contents of the paper signed by her:
Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. 401; Frew
v. Clarke, 80 Pa. 170. That presumption is supported by proponent's
testimony and is nowhere contradicted. In this respect this case differs
from that first cited for there the evidence tended to show that the will
was not read to or by the testatrix, or explained to her, before or after
its execution, and there the question of her knowledge of the contents of
the will was submitted to the jury."
The learned justice likewise observed that the signature of testatrix being
normal tended to disprove contestants' contention as to her physical and mental cordition.11
In Zimmerman v. Zimmerman 2 Woodward, J., explained:
"When a will duly executed is offered for probate, the law presumes
competency in -the testator, and that the instrument expresses his free
and unconstrained wishes in regard to the disposition of his property. This
presumption may be rebutted by showing, to the satisfaction of a jury, that
the will was obtained by fraud and imposition practiced on the testator,
or by duress, or by undue influence. What constitutes undue influence, is a
question which must depend very much on the circumstances of each case.
It is in its nature one of those inquiries which cannot be referred to any
general rule. Yet many principles have been settled by judicial decision
which, properly applied, afford in most cases an adequate guide to a right
decision of the question. Thus one has a right by fair argument and
persuasion to induce a testator to make a will inhis favor; Miller v. Miller,
10 258 Pa. 542 (1917) 102 A. 212.
11 See also Keen's Est., supra, note 10, wherein Walling J., makes reference to the signature
of testatrix being in a firm natural hand, identical with her normal handwriting, thus disproving the
comtention of mental and physical weakness. On the general subject 'f mental and physical weakness

raising a presumption of undue influence, see valuable note collating Penna. cases, 66 A.L.R. 256.
12 See note 7, supra.
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3 Ser. & R. 267. And it is not sufficient to set aside a will to show declarations of the testator that he intended to make a different one, but that his
wife had a high temper and interferred: Moritz v. Brough, 16 S. & R.
403."
Consequently, in cases of marital influence the presumption is on the side of
the proponent and the burden upon the contestants to show some facts that would
indicate the exertion upon the part of proponent of some species of influence
which the courts have characterized as undue or some evidence of extreme infirmity
3
or mental weakness upon the part of the willmaker.1
A distinguished legal writer 14 has suggested that undue influence may be
more readily predicated of a husband over his wife than that of a wife over her husband, but it would appear difficult to dogmatize on such intricate matters.
Filial Influences.
Filial is defined as pertaining to a son or daughter and therefore bearing upon
the relation of a child to a parent. The attitude of the law towards those sustaining
filial relationships and in respect to mutual willmaking is the same as that already
discussed respecting the marital relationship.
About the turn of the century the case of Robinson v. Robinson", was litigated
and attracted much attention by reason of the social prominence of the litigants and
may still be considered as a leading caseon this topic.
The testatrix was an aged woman who executed a will in favor of her son who
was charged with having exerted undue influence over the mother in the execution
of the will. Issues were framed covering five specifications, the first three involving
questions of fact as to the execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of the
maker. The remaining two specifications were directed to the question of undue influence. The jury was directed to find for the proponents on the first three issues and
the latter two went to the jury who found for the contestants. On appeal the judgment was affirmed, Dean, J., delivering the opinion. On the matter of undue
influence the following extract from the charge by the trial court was approved:
"A son may importune his mother to make a will in his favor. He has a
perfect right to do it, and if the only effect was to ,move her affections
or sense of duty or judgment, he has a perfect right to do it; but if these
importunities were such as the testator had not the power to resist, and
yielded for the sake of peace and quiet, or escaping from serious distress
of mind, if they were carried to a degree by which the free play of testator's
judgment, or discretion, or wishes were overcome, it is undue influence.
He can coax her, but he must not drive her, either by moral coercion or
physical force."
18 Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 (1937)
188 A. 904, per Kephart, C. J., explaining that evidence
of weakness of mind or an enfeebled condition shows the degree of susceptibility of the testator's
mind to outside influences. But a prima facie case of undue influence cannot be made out from such
testimony without more: there must be evidence, direct or circumstantial, of improper conduct sufficient to dominate or control testator's mind.
14 Schouler on Wills, 6th Ed. Section 278-279.
15 203 Pa. 400 (1902), 53 A. 253.
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However, Mitchell, J., filed a dissenting opinion contending as follows:
"I would reverse the judgment on the broad ground that there was no
evidence on which the jury should have been permitted to set aside the
will.
"The contest before the jury, briefly stated, embraced three points, the
execution of the will, the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, and undue
influence by appellant. As to the first two points the evidence was such
that the judge directed a verdict for the will. This left for the jury only
the question of undue influence. Upon this there was no evidence amounting to a scintilla that any undue influence, if any ever existed at all,
operated at the time of the execution of the will. The instrument in its
final form was prepared by counsel in Pittsburgh, mailed directly to the
testatrix, and next'appears in the evidence when produced by the testatrix
from her own custody. The brunt of the argumeat against the will
amounts to no more than that is unnatural and suspicious. Whether a
will is unnatural in a moral or ethical sense which cuts off some descendants and favors others is a question of casuistry with which the law is
not concerned. A will is unnatural in a legal sense only when it is contrary
to what the testator under the admitted circumstances and with his known
sentiments would have made, and it is only on that ground that the question is admissible at all, to wit: that it tends to show that what testatrix did was not from her own natural impulse but from coercioa.
"In this case there is no room for any such contention, for the testatrix
in her will only continued what she had been doing for years, while in the
possession of full mental and physical vigor, putting the appellant on
the footing of her preferred child and favorite beneficiary.
"That at times she was dissatisfied with the reduction of her income and
its lavish expenditure, and expressed her intention to restrict her son's
management, was not unnatural, but does not prove undue influence.
She was a woman, as testified, of strong will, with counsel of her own,
not to mention the intermeddling advice of other relatives and nominal
friends, but she never displayed any desire to go beyond a little querulous
fault-finding, a not uncommon entertainment of the indulgent parent.
"Taking the definition of undue influence as expressed in the opinion
of the court I find nothing in the evidence which comes anywhere near the
required standard."
In Aggas v. Munnel"' one of the issues was undue influence alleged to have
been exercised by a daughter who kept house for the testator, a Civil War veteran,
86 years of age at the time of the execution of the will. A caveat was filed against
the probate and the register certified the matter to the orphans' court and by it to the
court of common pleas for jury trial on the questions of testamentary capacity ana
undue influence. There was a general verdict by the jury for the contestants, upon
which judgment was entered and the proponent daughter appealed. Walling, J., in
reversing, ordered a judgment entered for the plaintiff-proponent n.o.v., holding
that the proofs taken as a whole did not support the finding of the jury on either or
both questions. In declaring there was nothing in the record to sustain the contention
16 302 Pa. 78 (1930)

152 A. 840.
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of undue influence, it is pointed out that the daughter did nothing improper to influence her father in the disposition of his property, even though she did call in an
attorney who drew the will. Furthermore, when the scrivener came, although the
testator asked how she desired the will drawn, her answer was that she wished him to
make the will just as suited him, which indicated she was not attempting to dictate
the contents of the will. And the Justice emphasized that the undue influence must
be such as to control the testator in the act of making the will, citing numerous
authorities to sustain this proposition.
In Pensyl's Estate17 an issue on the ground of undue influence was properly
refused, the evidence showing that the testatrix excluded two of her sons from any
participation in her estate on the ground that these sons "had not treated her right",
and it further appeared that the two sons thus excluded had actually instituted lunacy
proceedings against their mother, which proceedings had failed. These facts would
go far in explaining the mother's reasons for the exclusion. In Hook's Estate' i
there was an appeal from the decree of the register admitting the will to probate.
No issue was prayed for, but the court in an opinion sustaining the decree of the
register, held that there was neither lack of testamentary capacity nor undue influence shown and dismissed the appeal. In affirming the lower court, Mitchell, C. J.,
said inter alia:
"To set aside a will on theground of undue influence where the testator
is in full possession of his faculties and his testamentary capacity admitted
or established, the evidence must be clear and strong. Mere opinions or
suspicions, or belief not founded on facts testified to, will not be sufficient.
"The mere fact that the proponents of a will were the favored children
of the testatrix, and that they were more attentive to her in her declining
years, is not sufficient to establish undue influence in the absence of proof
of acts or course of conduct which unduly influences the testamentary act.
"The fact that a son tried unsuccessfully for years to induce his mother
to exclude from her household a daughter, is not evidence in favor of, but
rather against undue influence nor is the fact that at the time testatrix
executed her will she executed and delivered in escrow a deed to be delivered to a favorite son after her death on payment by him to her estate
of an amount alleged to be less than the value of the land, in itself evidence of undue influence.
"The fact that a favorite son of testatrix largely benefited by her will,
attended to her business and acted as her attorney in her lifetime, does
not in the absence of evidence of impairment of testatrix's mental faculties,
impose upon him the burden of proving that he exercised no undue influence on the mind of his mother."
Cookson's Estate19 affords an excellent illustration of the attitude of our
Supreme Court toward wills generally and those of parents particularly as they
discriminate in testamentary disposition among their children and at a time when old
(1893) 27 A. 669.
18 207 Pa. 203 (1903) 56 A. 428.
17 157 Pa. 465

19 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A, 904. In re:Ross' Estate, 355 Pa, 112 (1946) 49 A. 2d. 392.
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age and sickness have unquestionably affected the mental powers. This case was discussed in a previous paragraph as a type of old age testamentary capacity. It likewise
is useful in pointing out some applied principles of filial influence meeting judicial
approval. The mother, aged eighty-two years, executed a codicil to her will, while
extremely ill in a hospital and died four days later. By the terms of the codicil the
share of the daughter was increased to a half of the residuary estate and that of each
of two sons reduced to one quarter. The mother and daughter frequently quarreled
and there was bad feeling between the daughter and the one son. At probate the
subscribing witnesses, hospital attaches, testified to the testamentary capacity of testatrix. On appeal the court granted issues on both testamentary capacity and undue influence. The jury found against the proponent daughter on both issues who appealed assigning as error, inter alia, that the court erred in not directing the jury that there
was not sufficient evidence to sustain the charge of undue influence. Kephart, C. J.,
reviewing the evidence, concluded that the record was void of any evidence upon
which a finding of undue influence could be predicated. The judgment was reversed
and a new trial awarded by reason of the prejudicial error of the court in charging
the jury, at least by implication, that the testimony of the attending doctor concerning the testatrix's mental capacity at the time of the execution of the will was of
greater weight than that of the confidential agent of testatrix, particularly in view
of the fact the doctor was not present and the agent was present at the execution and
had drawn the codicil. The daughter, at the request of the mother, according to her
testimony, had sent for the agent and was present when the will was signed, although
out of the bedroom when the agent and the testatrix consulted concerning the
codicil. At the trial the subscribing witnesses in their testimony described the
testatrix as in a dazed and comatose condition. The agent and the daughter testified
the decedent was rational, wide awake and fully understood what she was doing.
The burden rested upon the contestant and there was no shifting to the daughter as
her relationship to testatrix was not confidential, citing Aggas v. Munnell.2 0 There
was no evidence of persuasion or solicitation and even if there had been such does
not constitute undue influence. 21 Evidence of weakness of mind or enfeebled condition will show susceptibility to undue influence but must be followed by evidence,
direct or circumstantial, of improper conduct sufficient to dominate or control testator's mind. 22
In Kish v. Bakaysa 23 the appeal was the result of refusal of the court below to
submit issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence and the giving of peremptory instructions to the jury to answer affirmatively that the testator was of sound
mind and memory and that the will was not procured by exercise of undue influence.
Motions for new trial and judgment n.o.v. were denied. In affirming the judgment,
Drew, J. pointed out that the testator died at the age of 81, having made the will
20
21
22
23

302 Pa. 78 (1930) 152 A. 840.

Brennan's Est.,
312 Pa. 335 (1933) 168 A. 25; Koon's Est.,
293 Pa. 465 (1928) 143 A. 125.
Phillip's
Est., 244 Pa. 35 (1914) 90 A. 457; Heister v.Heisetr, 122 Pa. 239 (1888) 16 A. 342.
330 Pa. 533 (1938)

199 A. 321.
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about a year before. He was survived by seven children, all of full age, his wife having predeceased him. The will provided for the payment of debts and the establishment of a trust fund for the saying of masses, and provided that five children were
each to receive $1.00 and the balance of the estate, approximately $2,000 was to be
divided into four parts, two of which were bequeathed to the church and the two
remaining parts respectively to his two sons. The court pointed out that the evidence
offered to show undue influence was wholly inadequate even if fully credited to
support the charge according to the standard of proof required by our cases. The
testimony relied upon by contestants on this point was that one of the sons in the
presence of his sister had said to the father:
"Your will, the way you have it, is not right, it should be changed and
give everything to the priest and the clhrch."
At another time it was alleged that the priest in the presence of three of the
children had said to the testator:
"This Will rust be changed because it is not right."
It did not appear that these expressions influenced the testator in the slightest
and there was no improper conduct shown with respect to the execution of the will
itself.
Likewise in Royer's Estate24 the testatrix aged 82 years made a will giving the
residue of her estate to her son. A daughter of the testatrix appealed from the probate and the court refused to grant an issue on the question of undue influence. In
affirming the decree in a per curiam, it was stated that there was no evidence whatsoever to sustain the charge of undue influence, the testatrix having been shown
to be in full possession of her faculties at the time of the execution of the will by two
totally disinterested witnesses whose testimony convinced the trial court beyond any
question of doubt as to their absolute credibility. There was no evidence of weakness
of body or mind on the part of testatrix and none whatsoever indicating a confidential relationship between the testatrix and her son, although it was stated to be
true that he assisted her with her affairs and in fact was constantly taking care of her,
taking her where she desired to go and rendering her every service possible.
In contrast with these cases Perret v. Perret25 is recalled where on the trial of
an issue devisavit vel non, in which the alleged will was attacked on the ground of
undue influence, it was held that the case is for the jury where the evidence on behalf
of the contestant, although contradicted, tends to show that his mother after a quarrel
with the contestant declared that she would have his father cut him off without a
cent, and it being further shown that she possessed great influence over her husband
who feared to resist her and that she immediately sent for a lawyer and had the will
in question prepared disinheriting the contestant and that she told her husband, who
was ill and weak at the time and died of senility five days thereafter, that if he did
not sign the will she would put him out of the house, and that she remained with her
24
25

339 Pa. 423 (1940)
See note 9, supra.

12 A. 2d. 923.
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husband until the will was executed. Furthermore, it was shown in this case that the
testator and his son had always been on good terms and that he had expressed his
intention to divide the property equally between the son, who had been very kind to
him, and his daughter. At the trial evidence of the declarations of the mother were
held admissible as made a few hours before the will which made her the principal
beneficiary and disinherited the son was drawn and executed to the effect that she
would have her husband cut off the contestant, his only son, without a cent.
The strict rule against a confidential agent is not applied in cases of blood relationship unless the element of the weakened physical and mental condition of the
testator is injected even though the will be written by the confidant who is by its
terms a principal beneficiary. In Blume v. Hartman26 Green, J., said:
"Beyond question, if the will had been written by a stranger who was
by its terms the principal beneficiary, the burden of proving that the testatrix was acquainted with its contents, and had an intelligent consciousness
of the proportion of the estate to be taken by the beneficiary, would rest
upon him. But the Court below made a most ample exception to this rule
in favor of the plaintiff, because he was a son of the testatrix and therefore
had a right of importunity in his own favor without incurring the penalty
of affirmative proof."
On the other hand in Miller's Estate27 it was held that where a testator, although possessed of testamentary capacity is aged, infirm bodily, with mental faculties impaired, makes a will giving to his son, who is also his confidential advisor,
three-fourths of his estate there arises a presumption of fact that undue influence was
brought to bear on the mind of the testator and consequently the burden is on the
son as beneficiary to rebut the presumption.
Likewise, in Miller v. Miller2 8 it was held that in a contest over a will in which
a son is largely preferred, if it appears that the son, although not the father's attorney, was his trusted and confidential agent, the burden of proof is on the son to rebut
the presumption of undue influence. Although nothing is said in the latter case about
the testator's mental or physical condition, apparently the rule of law as enunciated
was based upon such facts.
That thi's is a fair assumption appears in the opinion of the trial court in
Friend'sEstate29 which opinion was approved per curiam, and wherein it appeared
that in a contest over a will in which a son was largely preferred, although it appeared that the son was his mother's trusted confidential agent the burden of proof,
in the absence of testimony tending to show that the mental faculties of the testatrix
were impaired, was placed upon the contestant to show that undue influence was
used.
It is therefore the law that certainly between parent and child mere kinship
26 115 Pa. 32 (1886) 8 A. 219.
27 179 Pa. 645 (1896) 36 A. 129.
28 187 Pa. 572 (1898) 41 A. 277.

29 198 Pa. 363 (1900) 47 A. 1106.
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does not give rise to any inference of a confidential relationship and this same view
has been extended to brothers and sisters. In Leedom v. Palmer" Kephart, J., explained:
"The mere existence of kinship does not, of itself, give rise to confidential relation such as would impose the burden of proof on.the one
receiving a gift to assert its validity. A child may take a gift from a parent
without being required to furnish explanatory testimony: Clark v. Clark,
172 Pa. 309, 336, wherein the court quoted the English rule announced in
Baker v. Bradley, 7 D. G., M. & G. 597; Bigelow on Fraud, 368; Worral's
App., 110 Pa. 349, 364; Carney v. Carney, 196 Pa. 34, 38; Compton V.
Hoffman, 265 Pa. 257, 263; Neurcuter v. Scheller, 270 Pa. 80; Langdon
v. Allen, I W. N. C. 359, 397; Heister v. Heister, 228 Pa. 102, 107. Nor
is there confidential relation simply because the parties to the transaction are brothers and sisters: Funston v Twining ,202 Pa. 88, 90."
Social Influences.
In discussing testamentary power in a previous chapter, it was declared to be
the law that a person proved to be of sound disposing mind and memory has a
right to dispose of his property as he pleases subject to the restrictions as enumerated.
The fact that the will may appear to some to be unjust is no evidence of lack of
testamentary capacity or that the will executed through undue influence.
Despite the passage of the years wherein our courts have given expression to
sentiments on this subject, nevertheless the homily of Paxson, J., in Cauf/man v.
Long 3' still remains the classic expression wherein he observed:
"'fhc growing disposition of courts and juries to set aside last wills
and testaments, and to substitute in lieu thereof their own notions as to
what a testator should do with his property, is not to be encouraged. No
right of the citizen is more valued than the powcr to dispose of his property
by will. No right is more solemnly assured to him by the law. Nor does it
depend in any sense upon the judicious exercise of it. It rarely happens that
a man bequeaths his estate to the entire satisfaction of either his family or
friends. In many instances testamentary dispositions of property seem
harsh, if not unjust, the result, perhaps, of prejudice as to some of the testator's kindred, or undue partiality as to others. But these are matters about
which we have no concern. The law wisely secures equality of distribution where a man dies intestate. But the very object of a will is to produce
inequality and to provide for the wants of the testator's family; to protect
those who are helpless; to reward those who have been affectionate, and to
punish those who have been disobedient. It is doubtless true that narrow
prejudice sometimes interferes with the wisdom of such arrangements.
This isdue to the imperfections of our human nature. It must be remembered that in this country a man's prejudices are a part of his liberty. He
has a right to them; he may be unjust to his children or relatives; he is
entitled to the control of his property while living, and by will to direct its
use after his death, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by law.
Where a man has sufficient memory and understanding to make a will,
30 274 Pa. 22 (1922) 117,A. 410.

31 82 Pa. 72 (1876)

Cf. Paxson's Estate, 221 Pa. 98 (1908) 70 A. 280.
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and such instrument is not the result of undue influence, but is the uncontrolled act of his mind, it is not to be set aside in Pcnnsylvania without
sufficient evidence, nor upon any sentimental notions of equality."
The influences motivating a testamentary disposition may arise from a variety
of social phenomena such as kind treatment, and friendly, services, or a beneficiary may be named by a testator not for love for the beneficiary but on account of hatred, aversion and prejudice against someone else. These latter are not commendable
motives but on the other hand are not necessarily unlawful. In addition to the classic
of Paxson, J., supra, another helpful statement is found in Wingroi'e v. Wingrove
where Sir James Hannen, addressing the jury, said:
"A man may be the companion of another, and may encourage him in
evil courses, and so obtain what is called an undue influence over him,
and the consequence may be a will made in his favor. But that again,
shocking as it is, perhaps even worse than the other, will not amount to
undue influence.
"To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be-to sum
it up in a word-coercion. It must be a case in which a person has been
induced by means such as I have suggested to you to come to a conclusion
that he or she will make a will in a particular person's favor, because
if the testator has only been persuaded or induced by considerations which
you may condemn, really and truly to intend to give his property to another, though you may disapprove of the act, yet it is strictly legitimate,
in the sense of its being legal. It is only when the will of a person who
becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do, that it is undue influence."
In Roberts v. Clemens 3 binding instructions for the proponent of a will were
approved by the Supreme Court where the issue was undue influence and the facts
were that the testatrix, a widow with no children and only collateral relatives, had
given a large bequest to the husband of her cousin which was to the prejudice of
her living brother and the children of a deceased one. It was shown that the legatee
and his wife had been particularly kind and attentive to the testatrix and it was no
more than natural that she would try to award them by the gift of the larger part
of her small estate, approximately worth $2,000.00. Again in Morgan's Estate3 4
a testator passed over an only child, his daughter, and gave the bulk of his estate
to her two children and this disposition was attacked as being an unnatural one and
therefore evidence of undue influence. However, it was pointed out that the testator
had a prejudice against his son-in-law and that his reason for passing over his daughter was to avoid the probability of his estate coming into the hands or management
of her husband. However, it was emphasized that although the prejudice may have
been without just foundation, nevertheless it was the right of the testator, not being
convicted of testamentary incapacity, to do with his own as be pleased.
82 1i P. D. 81.
38 202 Pa. 198 (1902) 51 A. 758.
34

219 Pa. 355 (1907) 68A.953.
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It has been declared, however,3" that where the testator is shown to be of weak
mind without regard to the cause or causes from which that weakness has arisen,
though it bc not sufficient in itself to wholly destroy testamentary capacity, and the
person, by whom or under whose advice the will has been written, be a stranger to
the testator's blood, receives a legacy or bequest, large as compared to the testator's
estate, then the burden of proof shifts from the proponent of the will. In such
case, not only must testamentary capacity be affirmatively approved, but it must
also be shown that the testator acted with a full knowledge of the value of his estate.
In Lawrence's Estate36 it was declared that although the will of the testator
might seem to be unreasonable or unnatural in its provisions, or there might be
provided an unequal distribution among the next of kin, or a gift of property to a
person other than the natural recipient of the testator's bounty, nevertheless, there
is no presumption of mental weakness arising from such a will, except where the
distribution is so gross or ridiculous as to give rise to a presumption of insanity. Unreasonable or unnatural distribution, with other evidence, may be used to prove
incapacity, but standing alone it is insufficient, but such distribution may become
of the utmost importance when considering the question of undue influence to which
it is more closely related.
In certain New York decisions where the will was contrary to the dictates of
natural affection, of justice, and of duty, the burden was placed upon the proponents
to give some reasonable explanation of its unnatural character, or at least that it was
not the result of mental defect, obliquity or perversion. 37 It is not however conceived
that our cases go to this length, although it is true that where a stranger has actively
participated in the preparation and execution of a will in which he is the beneficiary,
the burden of proof is placed upon him to show that it was not the result of undue
influence.38
On the other hand, in a very noted case, Llewellyn's Estate,39 involving over
one million dollars, the testator left his entire estate to a friend and employee who
was a stranger to his blood. Distant relatives contested the will but were refused
the granting of issues on both questions of testamentary capacity and undue influence, and this action was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Walling, J., after pointing
out that the beneficiary did not draw the will or suggest that it be drawn or that
he be made legatee but on the contrary it was drawn by a lawyer he had never seen
before and who was called at the decedent's request further observed that assuming
the will was executed under such circumstances as placed upon the legatee the burden
of showing it was the free and voluntary act of the testator, that burden, as the
hearing judge and orphans' court had found, was fully met, it being clearly shown
that the decedent although weak in body was in full and perfect possession of his
25 Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 199 (1883). per Gordon, J.
132 A. 786.
37 7 Ann. Cas. 895.
29 Blume v. Hartman, 115 Pa. 32 (1886) 8 A. 219.
39 296 Pa. 74 (1929) 145 A. 810.

36 286 Pa. 58 (1926)
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mind and that the will was his suggestion and drawh by his attorney to carry out his
wishes and that proponent had no important part. in its preparation. The learned
justice then gave these additional reasons and authorities:
"It may also be added that it is only where the testator is of weak
mind, arising from physical or mental ailment, that a presumption of
undue influence arises when a stranger to his blood procures a large
legacy. In re Adams Estate, 220 Pa. 531, 69 A. 989, 123 Am. St. Rep. 721;
Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 208 Pa. 414, 57 A. 821; Robinson v. Robinson,
203 Pa. 400, 53 A. 253; In re Friend's Estate, 198 Pa. 363, 366, 47 A.
1106; Herster v. Herster, 122 Pa. 239, 16 A. 342, 9 Am. St. Rep. 95;
Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 199, 204. To place the burden of proof on
proponent, there must be evidence of weakened intellect. In re Phillips'
Estate, 244 Pa. 35, 44, 90 A. 457; Gongaware et al v. Donehoo, et al, 255
Pa. 502, 508, 100 A. 264. In the instant case, the physical weakness apparently had no effect upon his mental faculties."
Other cases involving similar facts where those not related participated by
will in the estate of the decedent, and where the facts so completely explained the
situation that the lower court did not feel justified in granting issues to determine
questions of testamentary capacity and undue influence, and such action has been
41
supported by our Supreme Court, are Keen's Estate,40 Brennan's Estate, Geist's
43
42
Estate, and Moher's Estate. In Buhan v. Keslar" the case was tried twice' and on
the first trial the jury found in favor of the will, On the second, which was the
subject of the present review, they found against the will and the judgment entered
in this case on appeal was reversed with directions to the court below to enter judgment in the plaintiff-proponent's favor. The will in question was written by Buhan,
the beneficiary, at the testator's dictation, but the Supreme Court determined from
the overwhelming weight of evidence that the testator was competent, clear minded
and entirely understood what he was doing, what his estate consisted of, who were
his relatives and what he wished to do, and further that there was no sufficient
evidence of undue influence as defined in our cases, citing inter alia Geist's Estate4"
supra. On the contrary in Griffin's Estate46 with the facts appearing as to the weakness of mind of the testatrix, and the gift to strangers, the Superior Court felt
impelled to reverse the decree of the lower court and order the awarding of an issue
as prayed for.
Likewise in Patti'sEstate4'7 the Superior Court reversed an order of the orphans
court refusing to award an issue devisavit vel non wherein the writing was attacked
upon three grounds, namely (1) that at the time of the execution of the will Patti
did not possess testamentary capacity, (2) that the writing was procured by undue
40 299 Pa. 430 (1930) 149 A.737.
41

312 Pa. 335 (1933) 168 A. 25.
191 A. 29.

42 325 Pa. 401 (1937)

48 343 Pa. 299 (1941) 22 A. 2d. 680.
44 328 Pa. 312 (1937) 194 A.917.
45 See note 42, supra.
46 109 Pa. Super. 594 (1933) 167 A. 613.
47 133 Pa. Super. 81 (1938) 1 A-ad. 791.
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influence exerted by the beneficiaries, and (3) that the writing was not executed in
the manner required by statute. The facts in the case are rather unique, involving
a miner seriously injured and being in a hospital in a dying condition and certain
strangers to his blood obtaining an alleged will in their favor. The attitude of the
court and sufficiency of the facts are outlined in the following from the opinion of

Parker, J.:
"As we have indicated, we may not here assume at the present time
the evidence that the beneficiaries in this will were either of them confidential advisers of the testator, but they are in a similar position. It is not
important for present purposes whether we speak of the burden of proof
that was upon Mr. and Mrs. Corozzi, or of a duty on them to go ahead
with the evidence, or of a presumption against them, or whether we assume from their silence that their evidence would have been favorable to
to the appellant. We are now concerned in an examination of the weight
of the evidence produced rather than with the order of proofs. The facts
remain that in any view of the case the mental capacity of Patti was seriously impaired and a stranger to his blood had an active part in the
preparation and execution of the paper which gave his entire estate to
strangers, Mr. and Mrs. Corozzi. They have not testified themselves nor
furnished one iota of evidence tending to show that the paper was his true
and free act, uninfluenced and unrestrained. These facts weigh so heavily
against the proponents that we are convinced this is a proper case for the
submission of the issue to a jury. With a full appreciation of the heavy
burden that is here upon the appellant, we are of the opinion that there
is a substantial dispute as to the testamentary capacity of Patti and as to
the undue influence alleged to have been exercised by Mrs. Corozzi, and
that if a jury should find in favor of the appellant a court could conscionably sustain' such finding. The appellant made out much more than a
prma facie case. We feel that it was an abuse of judicial discretion to refuse the issue.
"It has been said many times that one may by will dispose of his property as he sees fit and that he is entitled to act on his own prejudices, but the
law is rigid in insisting that one of weak mind, whether from inherent
causes or by reason of illness, shall not be imposed upon by the art and
craft of designing persons. The law has imposed a burden on strangers
to the blood of a testator who receive extraordinary benefits and who are
shown to be in a position where they might exercise a nefarious influence
on one so weakened in mind by disease or illness to make the fullest disclosure of all the circumstances connected with the making and execution
of a will."
One of the most recent cases reflecting the attitude of the Supreme Court in
the matter of wills with gifts to strangers to the blood is that of Noble's Estate48
wherein there was an appeal from the refusal of an issue to determine whether
testator lacked testamentary capacity and whether the will was obtained by undue influence exerted by the stranger beneficiary. In affirming the order of the lower
49 338 Pa. 490 (1940) 13 A. 2d. 422, accd. Fink's Estate, 310 Pa. 453 (1933)
re: Ash's Estate, 351 Pa. 317 .(1945) 41 A. 2d. 620.

165 A. 832. In
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court Linn, J., made the following observations with citation of many authorities
already discussed herein under this topic:
"The two grounds on which the hisue was asked, lack of testamentary
capacity and undue influence, shade into each other. There is really no
evidence worthy the name to be submitted to the jury on the point ot undue influence. A number of the testator's friends testificd to expressions
of affection for Probst made from time to time by the testator. At the
time he made his will the testator was old., was not very well, had lapses
of memory, but notwithstanding these infirmnitics, was competent to
make a will. lie kept it until he died more than a year and a half later.
Considering all the circumstances disclosed in the evidence and discusscd
at length by the learned court below, we all agree that there is no support
whatever for the suggestion that there was abue of discretion in refusing
the issue.. In addition to the cases quoted above, sce, generally, Llewellyn's
Estate, 296 Pa. 74, 145 A. 810; Minnig's Estate. 300 Pa. 435, 150 A.
626; Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 168 A. 25; Kline's Estate, 322 Pa.
374, 186 A. 364; Geist's Estate. 325 Pa. 401, 191 A. 29; Bul-man v. Kesler, 328 Pa. 312, 194 A. 917; Kish v. Bakaysa, 330 Pa. 533, 199 A. 321;
Olshefski's Estate, 337 Pa. 420, 11 A. 2d. 487."
Meretricious Influences.
This topic has had an interesting career of mutation through our cases but the
doctrine is now fairly settled. By meretricious is meant immoral and the influences
referred to are those arising between two persons by reason of an immoral relationship. The question is what effect, if any, does such a relationship have upon the will
of the one leaving property to the other as an element of undue influence. In Dean
v. Negley49 Lowrie, C. J., takes judicial notice of the strong influences that arise
frequently out of an illicit relationship between two persons. In Wingrove v. Wingrove5" Sir James Hannen states in a very clear way the situation:
"We are all familiar with the use of the word 'influence'; we say that one
person has an unbounded influence over another, and we speak of evil
influences and good influences but it is not because one person has unbounded influences over another that therefore when exercised, even
though it may be very bad indeed, it is undue influence in a legal sense of
the word. To give you some illustrations of what I mean, a young man may
be caught in the toils of a harlot, who makes use of her infl uent e to induce
him to make a will in her favor, to the exclusion of his relatives. It is unfortunately quite natural that a invin so entangled should yield to that
influence and confer large bounties on the person with whom he has been
brought into such relation yct the law does not attempt to guard against
those contingencies."
However, in Dean v. Negley5l Lowrie, C. J., did attempt to guard against
such contingencies by holding that where a devise was made by the testator to the
children of the woman with whom he had lived for years in adultery, a presumption
of fact arose that the gift was the result of undue influence brought to bear upon
49 41 Pa. 312 (1862).
50 i1 P. D. 81.

51 Supra, note 46.
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the testator. Indeed, the learned chief justice was convinced that it would be proper
to hold the presumption as one of law but he did not press this conclusion. The
line of reasoning was that where the testamentary disposition involved relationship
which was legal, the law in turn safeguarded the same with the presumption of
regularity and validity. On the other hand where the testamentary disposition involved a relationship which was illegal, a presumption of irregularity of the
disposition should then be raised. To this was added the following:
"If the law always suspects, and inexorably condemns undue influence
and presumes it from the nature of the transaction, in the legitimate
relations of attorney, guardian, and trustee, where such persons seem
to go beyond legitimate functions, and work for their own advantage,
how much more ought it to deal sternly with unlawful relations, where
they are, in their nature, relations of influence over the kind of act that
is under investigation."
This form of argumentation not only confuses law and morals which are not
convertible terms5" but it also sets up a presumption which may be contrary to fact,
thus defeating the will in an effort to inculcate morals or to punish immorality. 53 In
Main v. Ryder,54 Mercur, J. endeavors to explain Dean v. Negley' 5 by stating that
the judge there repudiated the presumption of law theory and left the matter to the
jury as a question of fact, citing to the same effect Rudy v. Ulrich" and concluding
thus:
"No clearfy defined weight can be given to such testimony. Much must
depend on the particular circumstances of each case. It is an element
undoubtedly to be considered."
However, in Wainwright's Appeal5.7 Sharswood, C. J. flatly declared:
"In an issue devisavit vel non on the allegation of undue influence by
the mother of an illegitimate child, the legatee in the will, the unlawful
cohabitation of the mother with the testator is not of itself sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer undue influence. ' '58
In Kustus v. Hager5" the will was sustained of a testator who left his estate to
a woman, alleged to be his paramour and who kept house and cared for him. The
testator's habits were such that his relatives had disowned him. However, after his
death they manifested sufficient interest to contest his will on the grounds of undue
influence exercised by the legatee. The evidence showed testator to have had testamentary capacity, the will having been prepared by his lawyer and witnessed by him
and another in his office. The legatee took no part in the preparation or execution
of the will and in fact at the time disavowed any interest in the estate except to be
52 See Law and Morals - Lectures on Legal History - Ames (1913) Cambridge - Harvard Univ.
Press.
53 Cf. Paxson, J., Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72 (1876).
54 84 Pa. 217 (1877).
55 Supra, note 49.

56
57
68
50

69 Pa. 177 (1871).
89 Pa. 220 (1879).
Cf. Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. 17 7(1871).
269 Pa. 103 (1920) 112 A. 45.
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repaid certain loans and to be compensated for domestic services performed. The
court declared there was not the slightest evidence of undue influence practiced. In
Wertheimer's Estate,60 Kephart, J. opined:
"It may be doubted whether the rule in Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. 312,
Reichbenbach.v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564, and Snyder v. Erwin, 229 Pa.
644, 'that, where meretricious relation has been shown to have existed

between the testator and the principal heneficiary under his will and the

will diverts the entire estate from the natural objects of the testator's
bounty and gives it over to a woman, he has just married and with whom
adulterous commerce has been carried on, the presumption arises that the
will was procured by undue influence,' is still the law: Ewart's Estate, 246
Pa. 579, 585, 586; Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 1.03, 110, 111, where it appears the rule has been considerably modified if not entirely departed
from."
In Weber v. Kline" several years later, the same justice referring to the above
remarks as made in Wertheimer's Estate62 declared:
"The existence of a meretricious relation standing alone will not give
rise to a presumption of undue influence. Wertheimer's Estate, supra."
Thus, the courts vacillated about three quarters of a century and by coincidence
in the same period developed the doctrine of the judicial functions in the granting
or refusing of issues devisavit vel non. Central Trust Co. v. Boyer follows in sequence; wherein is confirmed the doctrine that a meretricious relationship shown
to exist between the testator and the chief beneficiary of the will does not of itself
establish a charge of undue influence but supplies to this conclusion the compelling
corollary that where the testator has made an unnatural and inofficious will at a time
when according to the evidence his general course of conduct was dominated by
the paramour, the hearing judge is justified in submitting to a jury the quetion
of undue influence exercised by the beneficiary-paramour. Furthermore, the jury
having found for the contestant and the chancellor having concurred in this finding,
the judgment on the verdict should be affirmed, the court on appeal having presented to it the question whether in view of the relevant rules of law applicable to
the case, is it conceivable a judicial mind desiring only to arrive at the truth and do
exact justice on due consideration of the evidence as a whole, could reasonably havereached the conclusion of the court below. Drew; J., in a strong, well-reasoned
opinion for the majority court answers the question in the affirmative and the judgment is affirmed. Schaffer, J. dissented from this view, stating that according to his
impression of the record, there was no evidence of undue influence.
It would seem that the decision of the majority was sound and in furtherance
of the ends of justice and supportable on two grounds (1) the entire situation-presented by the evidence was essentially for the court and jury, and (2) although
60

286 Pa. 155 (1927)

61 293 Pa. 85 (1928)
62
63

Supra, note 60.
308 Pa. 402 (1932)

133 A. 144.
141 A. 721.
162 A. 806.
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there appeared to be no direct evidence of specific conduct of the beneficiary at the
time, together with the glaring fact that the will was inofficious and unnatural,
4
bring the case within the principle of Watmough's Estate.1
In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co." 5 Maxey, J. restates the established rule that the mere existence of the immoral relation does not give rise to a
presumption of undue influence and standing alone would not support the setting
6
aside of the will, citing many authorities already discussed. "
Confidential Influences.
Confidential relations beget confidential influences and such influences may
be more potent than those arising out of marital, filial, social or even meretricious
relations. Furthermore, a confidential relationship is essentially different from
that arising out of the other types mentioned, although some of these other types are
included in definitions of the former.
In Darlington'sEstate,G7 Green, J. explained:
"The confidential relation is not at all confined to any specific association of the paitics to it. While its more frequent'illustrations are
between persons who are related as trustee and cestui que trust, guardian
and ward, attorney and client, parent and child, husband and wife, it
embraces partners and co-partners, principal and agent, master and servant, physician and patient, and generally, all persons who are associated
by any relation of trust and confidence. When the relation exists the
consequent duties and obligations are perfectly well established by long
settled law."
In Null's Estate,68 it was said that a confidential relationship appears when
the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms but on the
one side there is overmastering influences, or on the other, weakness, dependence,
or-trust, justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage being possible. In Leedom
v. Palmer,6 9 Kephart, J. thus explained the matter:
"No precise language can define the limits of the relation or fetter the
power of the court to control these conditions. While not confined to
any specific association of parties, it generally exsits between trustee and
cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, and principal
and agent. In some cases the confidential relation is a conclusion of law, in
others it is a question of fact to be established by the evidence: Hetrick's
App., 58 Pa. 477, 479; Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263, 267."
64 258 Pa. 22 (1917) 101 A. 857.
65 320-Pa. 161 (1935) 181 A. 594.
66 Wertheimer's Est., 286 Pa. 155 (1926)

133 A. 144; Weber v. Kline, 293 Pa. 85 (1928) 141
v. Kelly, 219 Pa. 652 (1907) 69 A. 88; Chidster's Est., 227 Pa. 560 (1910) 76 A.
A, 721;, Allsnouse
4
418; Kustus v. 1 ager, 269 Pa. 103 (1920) 112 A. 45.
67 147 Pa. 624 (1892) 23 A. 1046; Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263 (1899) 43 A. 1030, where
caretaker of old and infirm testatrix was deemed a confidential advisor.
153 A. 137; perMaxey, J. Wetzel v. Edwards, 340 Pa. 121 (1940) 16 A.
68 302 Pa. 64 (1930)
2d. 441.

69 274 Pa. 2?. (1922)

117 A. 410.
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In Null's Estate 0 the same justice explained that in the cases of trustee and
cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, and principal and agent,
the confidential relation is a conclusion of law, whereas in other cases as parent and
child it is a question of fact to be established by the evidence. However, when a
confidential relation is established, the presumption is that the transaction, if of
sufficient importance, is void and there is cast on the donee the burden of proving
affirmatively a compliance with equitable requisites and overcoming the presumption by showing that no deception was used and the act was the intelligent and
understood act of the grantor, fair, conscientious and beyond the reach of -suspicion. 71
The rule of law, therefore, deduced from our cases is that where one occupying
a confidential relation either writes or procures to be written a will of his principal
in which the confidant is a beneficiary, the burden rests on the confidant to disprove
the exertion of undue influence, irrespective of the mental or physical condition of
the testator at the time of the will making. This burden, however, may be under
certain facts very light and the explanatory proof submitted by proponent considered
by the court as sufficient and not warranting the granting of an issue.
In Phillip's Estate,72 Moschzisker, J. pertinently remarked:
"Insofar as the testimony of the proponent of a will is not inherently
unreasonable or improbable, the judge may consider it in measuring the
preponderance of the evidence and in the absence of 'direct proof of undue influence actually exercised by the proponents' or 'a presumption
thereof arising against him from something in the evidence indicating
weakness or infirmity in the testatrix,' his testimony, when taken with
the other proofs in the case, may so far discharge the burden of explaining away any circumstances introduced by the contestants' witnesses,
which apparently require explanation, as to justify binding instructions
in favor of the will or the refusal of an issue."
On the other hand, if the will was not written or procured to be written by the
confidential advisor who benefits, nevertheless, the presumption of undue influence
arises if the physical or mental condition of the testator is shown at the time of the
will-making to have been perceptibly weakened. 7"
In Mohler's Estate74 the proposition was advanced by appellant-contestant
that the alleged will was void as a matter of public policy for the reason that the chief
beneficiary was the confidential advisor of testatrix although the uncontradicted
70 See note 68, supra.
71 Harrison v. Welsh, 295 Pa. 501 Pa. (1929)

145 A. 507; Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22 (1922)
117 A. 410: 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. sections 956, 957, 962.
72 244 Pa. 35 (1914) 90 A. 457; Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 208 Pa. 414 (1904) 57 A. 821, note
excellent opinion of Judge Endlich containing full review of the authorities and affirmed per curiam;
Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395 (1885) 1 A. 765, containing charge of Allison, P. J. to the jury
and extensive opinion by Green, J., affirming judgment, Mercer, C. J., and Clark, J. dissenting; see
same case Cuthbertson's Appeal, 97 Pa. 163 (1881) ; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495 (1882).
73 Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58 (1926) 132 A. 786.
74 343 Pa. 299 (1941) 22 A. 2d. 680.
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testimony was that the will was not written or procured to be written by the confidant
but was wholly the creation of the testatrix. Maxey, J. declared:
"There is no public policy condemning the receipt of a bequest by one
who stood in a fiduciary relationship to the giver. Such.a policy would impose an unwarranted restriction on the testamentary alienation of property
and would prevent a testator from bestowing gifts on his closest friends
and confidants, who often have stronger than kinsmen's claims on his
bounty. The law wisely casts upon a legatee standing in a confidential
relation to a testator the burden of proving that he used no undue influence to secure the legacy and this rule satisfies all the applicable requirements of 'public pohcy.'
At this point Yardley v. Cuthbertson75 is in order as the leading case in our
reports on bequests to confidential advisors, much cited along with the companion
case hereafter mentioned and both valuable contributions to this topic. In Culhbertson's AppeaP6 the lower court refused the granting of an issue but this action was
reversed on appeal and the case sent back for trial on the issu-., prayed for. Thus
Arose Yardley v. Cuthbertson77 as tried before Allison, P. J. of the Philadelphia
Court. The report embraces seventy-one pages and includes in full the charge to the
jury, the various exceptions taken and points submitted, and likewise an extensive
opinion by Green, J., in which each assignment of error is taken up and discussed
with ample citation of authorities. The opinion is interesting likewise for the prefatory remarks in the form of an admitted obiter dictum on the subject of the proper
arranging of the parties as plaintiffs and defendants in the issue together with some
remarks concerning the anachronism of the issue devisavit vel non, the learned justice
maintaining the thesis that the contestants properly should be placed as plaintiffs.
The matter was apropos in view of the action of the lower court in ruling that the
plaintiff-executor by reason of the pleadings and the record was not entitled to rest
with the mere proving formally of the will, but that he had the additional and immediate burden of going forward on the proofs as to testamentary capacity and
undue influence. 78 This unquestionably gave to contestants a tactical advantage
of grave importance as will be noticed in the study of our various cases on the matter
of issues in will cases. The ultimate result was that the jury found that the codicil
was not the act of the testator and that at the time he lacked testamentary capacity. On the question of undue influence the jury found for the plaintiff-executor. As to the framing of the first issue it was contrary to law as laid down
in our later cases as involving a mixed question of law and fact.7 9 On appeal the
judgment of the lower court was affirmed and consequently the codicil to the will
which was the subject of controversy was thrown out and the original will of the
testator made some years before stood as his last testamentary disposition. It is a
75 108 Pa. 395 (1885) 1 A. 765.
76 97 Pa. 163 (1881).
77 Supra, note 75.
78 Cf. Yorke's Est., 185 Pa. 61 (1896) 39 A. 1119, 15 Ann. Cas. 551; Musho's Est., 303 Pa. 56
340 Pa. 412 (1941) 17 A. 2d. 342.
(1931) 153 A. 899; Geho's Est.,
79 Phillips' Est., 299 Pa. 415 (1930) 149 A. 719; Tranor's Est., 324 Pa. 263 (1936) 188 A. 292
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matter of possible doubt in view of our later decisions80 whether in Cuthbertson's
Appeal8' the case should have been sent back for trial, and in Yardley v. Cuthbertson82 whether the charge of the court was not prejudicial to the proponent, 8' and
whether the proponent as a confidential advisor had not, in the light of contestant's
evidence, met the burden of explanation and the fact of testator's knowledge of
his property and the effect of the codicil. Again, in the light of our later decisions,
it may be questioned whether the court gave proper weight to the evidence of tle
attending doctor who was also a witness to the codicil, and who gave his opinion
very strongly as to the testamentary capacity of the testator in contrast with
the testimony of the expert witnesses called by contestants and whose opinions were
based upon an assumption or hypothesis of fact as presented by the evidence. 8
(The remainder of Prof. Hutlon'i article on this subect will be publiLfhed in the October
issue of the "Dickinsoff Law Review.")

80 Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A. 904; Mohler's Est., 343 Pa. 299 (1941) 22 A. 2d.
680; Cf. Phillips Est., 244 Pa. 35 (1914) 90 A. 457; Null's Est., 302 Pa. 64 (1930) 153 A. 137. See
also Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263 (1899) 43 A. 1030; Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 208 Pa. 414
(1904) 57 A. 821; Buhan v. Kesiar, 328 Pa. 312 (1934)- 194 A. 917; Noble's Est., 338 Pa. 490
(1940) 13 A. 2d. 422.
81 See note 76, supra.
82 See note 75, supra.
83 See Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A. 994.
84 Snyder's Est., 279 Pa. 63 (1924) 123 A. 663; Phillips' Est., 299 Pa. 415 (1930) 149 A. 719;
Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58 (1926) 132 A. 786; Wertheimer's Est., 286 Pa. 155 (1926) 133 A. 144;
Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 ( 1937) 188 A. 904; Olshefski's Est., 337 Pa. 420 (1940) 11 A. 2d. 487.
Cf. Pusey's Est., 321 Pa. 248 (1936) 184 A. 844.

